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 Executive Summary 
 
The paper aims to make a methodological contribution to the education segregation literature, 
providing a critique of previous measures of segregation used in the literature, as well as 
suggesting an alternative approach to measuring school segregation. It also provides new 
empirical evidence on changes in the extent of socio-economic segregation (measured by free 
school meals (FSM) entitlement) in English schools during the last fifteen years. Specifically, 
the paper examines Gorard et al.’s (2000a, 2003) finding that FSM segregation between 
schools fell significantly in the years following the 1988 Education Reform Act.  Using 
Annual Schools Census data from 1989 to 2004, the paper challenges the magnitude of their 
findings, suggesting that the method used by Gorard et al. actually overstates the size of the 
fall in segregation by 100%.  Our results show evidence of an increase in the index of 
dissimilarity in many Local Authorities, especially in London, although in the South-East as a 
whole we note that it falls. We also observe higher segregation in LEAs with higher 
proportions of pupils at voluntary-aided schools. We cannot confirm however, whether this is 
a causal relationship. It is not necessarily the case that the rise in the segregation index in 
these Local Authorities is attributable to the behaviour of VA schools. Much of this paper is a 
critique of previous methods used to measure segregation in schools. For example, we suggest 
that the GS index is not the optimal way of measuring changes in school segregation for the 
following reasons: 
 
1. GS is not bounded by 0 and 1: the upper boundary varies according to FSM eligibility, 
so GS is better described as an ‘indicator’ rather than an index of segregation; 
2. GS is not symmetric, meaning that it is capable of showing that FSM segregation is 
rising and NONFSM segregation is falling simultaneously; and 
3. GS is actually systematically variant to changes in overall FSM eligibility, except in 
the most stringent and unlikely of circumstances (the strict proportionate change in 
FSM); therefore we can properly describe it as composition variant.  It had a tendency 
to fall as FSM eligibility rises, regardless of the change in the unevenness of school’s 
shares of FSM and NONFSM pupils. 
 
In this paper we make the case for a segregation curve approach to measuring segregation and 
use one exemplar index, the index of Dissimilarity, to re-evaluate the extent of school 
segregation in England over the last fifteen years.  What can we conclude?  
  
• There was no pervasive increase in segregation over the period.  
• There are a number of potential explanations for this. For example, it may be that de 
facto school choice did not in fact increase during this period due to capacity 
constraints. 
• The analysis does however provide clear evidence of an increase in segregation, as 
measured by the index of dissimilarity, in many Local Authorities, particularly in 
London. The index is also higher in LEAs with higher proportions of pupils educated 
at voluntary-aided schools, although this relationship is not necessarily causal.   
• We have not been able evaluate the causal impact of policies that give schools 
increased control over their own admissions on segregation, however we have found 
an association between LEAs with higher proportions of pupils in schools that control 
their own admissions or have explicit select by ability and the level of FSM 
segregation.  We suggest that the level of measured segregation be carefully monitored 
over time, as the proportion of schools that are LEA community schools continues to 
fall.   
• We note that pupil numbers in secondary schools will fall from 2005.  It will be 
important that measures are taken to improve the ability of disadvantaged pupils to 
take up free places in the schools of their choice, otherwise the spare capacity in the 
system may well result in rising levels of segregation and in particular a concentration 
of disadvantaged pupils in some schools operating in deprived areas. 
 
We conclude that deciding how best to measure segregation is complex, combining 
fundamentally normative judgements about what exactly one intends to measure, with more 
technical judgements about the appropriate properties of the chosen measure.  We believe that 
we have made a good case for a specific approach, being open about the normative 
judgements we have made to reach our conclusion.  We have chosen to criticise one 
alternative approach to measuring segregation, GS, examining its properties in detail.  Further 
research is certainly needed to subject alternative methods of measuring school segregation, 
such as multilevel modelling or the isolation index, to the same level of scrutiny. 
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1 Introduction 
 
It is important for policy makers and researchers to know how socially segregated our schools 
are, yet researchers still widely disagree on how to measure segregation.  Measuring and 
trying to understand the reasons for changes in the level of school segregation in England 
have been central to the evaluation of policies designed to increase choice and competition 
both in and since the 1988 Education Reform Act (see Whitty et al., 1998, for an overview).  
The direction of the effect of school choice policies on segregation is not clear.  However, 
sociologists have argued that these policies would have unintended consequences in terms of 
stratification of different types of pupils across schools.  The central hypothesis is that greater 
school choice will lead to parents/pupils from higher socio-economic groups being more 
successful than those from lower socio-economic groups in choosing the higher performing 
schools. This in turn will cause these high performing schools to improve still further due to 
positive peer effects from their advantaged intake. This so called virtuous cycle will, it is 
suggested, lead to increasing polarisation between schools in terms of the ability and socio-
economic background of their intakes (Bourdieu, 1997; Bowe et al., 1994; Halsted, 1994). 
 
Whether this increased polarisation is actually happening in practice is of course an empirical 
question and a sizeable body of evidence, of differing types, has been accumulated on this 
issue. A number of qualitative and smaller scale quantitative studies  have suggested that there 
has indeed been increasing polarisation between schools, measured in terms of the distribution 
of more socially disadvantaged students across schools.  However, in the late 1990s, a major 
research programme on this issue, using large-scale longitudinal quantitative data, suggested 
that quite the opposite had happened in England and Wales following the 1988 Act (Gorard, 
1997, 1999, 2000; Gorard & Fitz, 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Gorard & Taylor, 2002a; Gorard et al., 
2002).  Using quantitative data on the distribution of pupils taking/eligible for free school 
meals (FSM) across all schools in the 1990s, the results from this body of work suggested 
that, contrary to most theoretical predictions, schools in England and Wales actually became 
less socially segregated in the 1990s.  Figure 1 illustrates the level of segregation in the years 
1989 to 1999, as measured by Gorard’s Segregation Index (GS) and reported in Gorard et al. 
(2003). 
 
Figure 1  Values of Gorard’s Segregation Index (GS) 
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This was a highly controversial finding, given that it contradicted the evidence from previous 
(generally smaller scale) studies. Gorard, Taylor and Fitz’s work then spawned a vigorous, 
and at times heated debate, that continues unabated (Gibson & Asthana, 2000, 2002; Harvey 
Goldstein, 2001; H. Goldstein & Noden, 2003; Gorard, 2002; Gorard, 2004; P. Noden, 2000; 
Philip Noden, 2002).  
 
Of course disagreements about how best to measure segregation are certainly not unique to 
educational research, and ‘index wars’ (Peach, 1975) erupt frequently, for example, in the 
measurement of residential racial segregation in US cities and gender segregation in the 
workplace.  Arguments combine normative disagreements about what segregation actually is 
with more technical arguments about the desirable properties of a segregation index.  The 
normative debate about what one means by the term segregation is central because it 
necessarily guides us in our assessment of the relative importance of the different technical 
features of any given index of segregation. 
 
The aims of this paper are twofold. Firstly, the paper seeks to shed further light on this 
ongoing methodological debate by providing both a normative discussion of what we mean 
by segregation, in the context of schools, as well as an explicit critique of the segregation 
index (the GS) used by Gorard, Taylor and Fitz to measure changes in school segregation 
over time.  Whilst the findings of Gorard et al. do appear to hold regardless of measure used, 
we argue that GS is not the optimal measure for making inferences regarding changes in 
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social segregation in schools. This is an important contribution to the literature, given the 
extensive use of the GS index in subsequent research on school segregation in England, Wales 
and Europe (e.g. Gorard & Smith, 2004; Gorard et al., 2003; Taylor et al., 2005).  The second 
aim of the paper is to propose some alternative measures of segregation that we argue are 
more appropriate for measuring segregation across schools.  Specifically, in this paper we 
make a case for researchers adopting indices that are consistent with the segregation curve, 
such as the index of dissimilarity or Hutchen’s Square Root index.1  We then illustrate the use 
of these alternative measures of segregation and provide new empirical evidence on the extent 
and nature of segregation in England in the 1990s and early 2000s.   
 
The rest of the paper is set out as follows.  Section 2 provides both a normative discussion of 
the term segregation in the context of schools analysis, as well as a more technical account of 
the principles of segregation. The section introduces the segregation curve as a means of 
representing segregation and the index of dissimilarity (D) as a summary statistics of this 
curve.  Section 3 describes Gorard et al.’s alternative index (the GS) and highlights the key 
features of that index.  Section 4 uses Annual Schools Census data to illustrate the extent to 
which the GS index provides a different pattern of changes in school segregation between 
1989 and 1995 onwards, as compared to alternative measures of segregation such as the 
dissimilarity index.  It then analyses recent Annual Schools Census data to provide some 
more current empirical evidence on the extent and nature of segregation in England.  Section 
5 concludes. 
 
 
2 A Good Index of Unevenness Segregation 
 
2.1 Defining segregation 
At a general level, segregation is the degree to which two or more groups are separated from 
each other.  In evaluating school choice policies we are particularly interested in whether the 
distribution of a particular group of pupils across schools in an area has become more uneven; 
 
1 For reasons of space, we are unable to consider a number of other methods that might potentially be used to measure segregation. We 
cannot therefore compare our indices, or indeed the GS index, to alternatives that have been used elsewhere in the literature (such as 
Goldstein’s multi-level modelling approach or Noden’s isolation index analysis). This is clearly an area for future research effort. 
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where unevenness is the first of five dimensions of segregation categorised by Massey and 
Denton (1988).2  In this paper, we focus solely on unevenness in the distribution of pupils 
who are either eligible for or in receipt of free school meals (FSM), using this as a proxy for 
social disadvantage (the drawback of this categorisation is discussed elsewhere (Croxford, 
2000; Shuttleworth, 1995)).  We define unevenness as the extent to which a school’s share of 
FSM and NONFSM pupils deviates from the ‘fair share’ of these pupils that they would have 
if FSM and NONFSM pupils were distributed evenly across schools. 
 
In choosing to define segregation as unevenness we have taken the first step in reducing a 
remarkably general term (segregation) to a more specific one (unevenness), a step that must 
be justified.  We choose unevenness rather than isolation, for example, because isolation 
incorporates ideas of both the overall size of the minority group and the unevenness in its 
distribution.  So, we argue that because education policy can only influence the latter, and not 
the former, unevenness in the distribution of a given minority group between schools is the 
relevant ‘policy lever’ for reducing all types of segregation between schools. 
 
2.2 Segregation curves and segregation indices 
Two group segregation, such as unevenness in the between school distribution of pupils 
eligible for free school meals (FSM) versus those not eligible for free school meals 
(NONFSM), can be graphically illustrated. Segregation curves show this unevenness without 
the loss of any information and without the need for strong value judgements regarding the 
exact location of unevenness.  Figure 2 shows segregation curves created using actual data for 
a cohort of year 9 students attending school in Gloucestershire Local Education Authority 
(LEA) in 2002/3.  The segregation curve is developed by first ranking the schools in order of 
their share of total pupils eligible for FSM in the LEA, then plotting the cumulative fraction 
of NONFSM pupils on the x axis and cumulative fraction of FSM pupils on the y axis.  The 
line of equality represents total evenness where every school has its ‘fair share’ of FSM pupils 
and NONFSM pupils.  Fair share means that if, for example, a school educates 16% of the 
pupils in an LEA, it will also educate 16% of the FSM pupils and 16% of the NONFSM 
 
2 The other dimensions being exposure (isolation), concentration (the amount of physical space occupied by the minority group), clustering 
(the extent to which minority neighbourhoods abut one another), and centralisation (proximity to the centre of the city). 
pupils.  Thus, the segregation curve plots the unevenness in the share of FSM pupils versus 
NONFSM pupils. 
 
Figure 2  The FSM Segregation Curve for Gloucestershire LEA 
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So far, identifying the extent of segregation encounters little controversy: using segregation 
curves we can always identify whether one distribution of pupils is more uneven than another, 
as long as the two segregation curves in question do not intersect.  However, where curves 
cross, value judgements are required in order to produce a complete ranking of segregation 
between, for example, different areas or different points in time (R. M. Hutchens, 2004).  The 
purpose of segregation indices is therefore to produce a complete and unique rank ordering of 
segregation curves by area/time, in essence summarising the extent of segregation across 
schools in a single numerical value. 
 
There are a set of segregation indices that are solely a function of the segregation curve, 
which means that if the segregation curve lies on the line of equality, the value of the index is 
by definition zero; if the segregation curve traces the x axis because all FSM pupils are 
concentrated in one school, the value of the index should be one.  Importantly, the value these 
indices must, by definition, be lower for one segregation curve where it is both closer to the 
line of equality at all places and does not intersect with another segregation curve.  So, for 
example in Figure 3, the segregation curves I and II are non-overlapping; all indices that are 
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solely a function of the segregation curve must place a higher value on the segregation 
relating to curve II compared to curve I. 
 
Figure 3  Two Non-Overlapping Segregation Curves 
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The segregation curve approach to developing segregation indices is well-established in the 
academic literature (Cortese et al., 1976; Duncan & Duncan, 1955; Massey & Denton, 1988) 
precisely because the value of an index developed under this method is easily interpretable.  
Segregation curve approach indices always incorporate the absolute view that 0 is complete 
evenness in the distribution and 1 is complete segregation, regardless of the relative size of 
the FSM and NONFSM groups.  It is certainly not the only approach in the literature, but we 
argue that it is the most appealing in this particular context. It allows measurement of the 
relative level of segregation in any situation, is axiomatically well-grounded (as shown in the 
next section) and has been shown to be the logical equivalent of the Lorenz curve approach in 
the inequality literature (Robert M. Hutchens, 1991).  The Lorenz curve approach recognises 
that value judgements are inherent in any measure of inequality (Atkinson, 1970), but that all 
distributions of income across individuals can be ‘fairly’ compared using indices where 
complete evenness is zero and complete inequality is one.  Thus, a segregation curve 
approach unifies the (mostly sociological) segregation literature and the (mostly economic) 
inequality literature. 
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2.3  Index of dissimilarity 
Continuing the segregation curve approach, this section introduces the index of dissimilarity 
(known as ‘D’ from now on), which has long been established as the most popular index of 
unevenness segregation, following the review of indices by (Duncan & Duncan, 1955). The 
use of D is not, however, without controversy.  D measures the ‘dissimilarity’ in the 
distribution of FSM pupils across schools from the distribution of NONFSM pupils across 
schools, is solely a function of the segregation curve and represents the maximum vertical 
distance between the segregation curve and the line of equality.  In the context of segregation 
between schools by free-school meal eligibility, measured at LEA level, its formula is: 
∑
=
−=
I
i
ii
NONFSM
nonfsm
FSM
fsm
D
12
1  
(1) 
where there are I schools in the LEA; school i has fsmi pupils eligible for FSM 
and nonfsmi pupils who are not eligible for FSM. 
In the LEA as a whole, the total number of pupils eligible for free school meals 
is denoted by ‘FSM’ whilst the number not eligible is denoted by ‘NONFSM’. 
For the remainder of this article, N and ni will represent the total number of 
pupils in the LEA and school i, respectively, such that N=FSM+NONFSM. 
The proportion of pupils eligible for FSM in the LEA, p = FSM/N. 
 
 
2.4  Axioms of a good segregation index 
There is no ‘perfect’ segregation index: each has different properties and incorporates 
different value judgements about the nature of segregation.  The use of D as the primary 
measure of unevenness segregation in areas such as occupational gender segregation and 
residential racial segregation stems from its meeting the criteria for a good index, i.e. it is 0-1 
bounded, is solely a function of the segregation curve and meets a set of generally agreed 
basic axioms reasonably well.  These are adapted from the axioms in Hutchens (2004),3 but 
are very similar to those discussed by James & Taeuber (1985).  It can be shown that a 
measure that satisfies these properties will always yield a ranking of segregation consistent 
with the ranking provided by non-intersecting segregation curves (Robert M. Hutchens, 
1991). 
                                                 
3 These five principles relate to Hutchen’s axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7.  Axioms 5 and 6 relate to an ability to aggregate and additively decompose 
a segregation index; D does not satisfy these axioms. 
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P1. Scale or composition invariance – D is invariant to a proportionate increase in FSM or 
NONFSM, providing each school’s share of the sub-group (e.g. FSM) remains constant and 
the distribution of the other sub-group (e.g. NONFSM) does not change.  This means that if 
new FSM pupils enter an LEA from outside, causing the number of FSM children to double 
across the LEA as a whole but the share in each school remains the same, the value of the 
index will not change. 
 
P2. Symmetry in groups – schools can be relabelled and reordered, yet the value of D 
remains the same.  This means that we are indifferent as to whether school A or school B is 
more segregated; we are simply interested in measuring the extent of segregation between the 
two schools. 
 
P3. Principle of transfers – D is usually capable of being affected by the movement of one 
individual from school to school.  Intuitively, this means that if a child who is eligible for 
FSM moves from a school with a small proportion of FSM children to a school with a high 
proportion of FSM children, then the index will show that segregation has increased.  Strictly, 
D does not meet this principle in its ‘strong form’, but it is does capture pupil movements 
from a school with more than their ‘fair share’ of FSM pupils to a school with less than their 
‘fair share’ of FSM pupils (the ‘weak form’). 4
 
P4. Organisational equivalence – D is unaffected by changes in the number of sub-areas; for 
example, if a school is divided into two sub-schools by proportional division, then the value 
of D will not change. 
 
P5. Symmetry between types - D is symmetric in the sense that pupils with FSM could be 
substituted for NONFSM pupils and vice versa in the formula to produce an identical value 
 
4 Strictly speaking the violation of the Principle of Transfers means we should not treat D as strongly segregation-curve-consistent because a 
dis-equalising movement will not always cause this index to indicate more segregation.  However, it is sufficiently so for the purposes of this 
paper and so we set aside this well-documented issue. 
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for D.  We note that there are indices, used in section 4, that are non-symmetric yet are still 0-
1 bounded and solely a function of the segregation curve. 
 
There are other segregation indices that, unlike D, meet the axioms above perfectly; most 
notably an index proposed by Hutchens (2001, 2004) called the Square Root index.  The 
rationale for using D however, is two-fold.  First, unlike the Square Root index it is familiar to 
researchers, and the Square Root index tends to display low values where the level of 
segregation is quite moderate, as is typical in schools.  Second, D is closely related to the GS 
index that we discuss in the next section and therefore seems to be the more appropriate and 
fairer comparison to GS. 
 
 
3 GS - the ‘Strongly Compositionally Invariant’ Index 
 
3.1 Gorard’s segregation index (GS) 
As can be seen, D meets many of the criteria for a good segregation index.  However, Gorard 
and Taylor created their own segregation index (known as GS from now on), criticising the 
appropriateness of D on the basis of a problem they label ‘strong compositional variance’ 
(Gorard & Taylor, 2002b).  This is distinct from the scale or composition invariance described 
above (in Proposition P1).  D is composition invariant in that it will not change value if new 
students entering an LEA causes the number of FSM children to rise but proportionately 
across all schools, i.e. provided that the shape of the segregation curve remains the same.  
However, if an event takes place that switches existing students’ status from NONFSM to 
FSM (for example, a recession increases overall FSM take-up or the measurement of FSM is 
changed from take-up to eligibility), the value of D will alter even if all schools retain their 
existing share of FSM pupils.  It does so because this type of event would alter the 
unevenness in the distribution of NONFSM pupils (Taylor et al., 2000).  For Gorard and 
Taylor (2002b), this was a problem that invalidated D’s use in school segregation research 
where overall FSM proportions tend to vary from year to year because it is possible for pupils 
to change status from NONFSM to FSM, and vice-versa. 
 
Gorard et al. rightly identified that the behaviour of an index in the event of an increase in 
FSM eligibility is particularly important in the context of educational research.  They 
suggested that ‘strong compositional invariance’ (SCI) is a desirable feature of an index and 
developed an alternative segregation index (GS) that aims to measure unevenness, controlling 
for proportionate switches in student status to FSM.  Whereas D calculates segregation based 
on the difference between the FSM share of pupils and NONFSM share of pupils at each 
school in the LEA, GS calculates segregation based on the difference between the FSM share 
of pupils and the share of total pupils (N) at each school in the LEA. 
 
GS can actually be calculated by first measuring D and then multiplying D by 1-p, where p is 
the proportion of FSM pupils: 
)1(*
2
1
1
pD
N
n
FSM
fsmGS
I
i
ii −≡−= ∑
=
 
(2) 
Where the number of FSM pupils increases by scalar λ and by the same proportion in every 
school such that FSM1=λFSM0 and fsm1i=λfsm0i, GS will remain constant.  Equation (2) 
shows that the distribution of NONFSM pupils is not in the calculation of GS, therefore the 
GS index ignores the fact that such a scalar increase in the number of FSM pupils will also 
alter each school’s share of NONFSM pupils. 
 
Gorard et al. made a strong case that GS was therefore the most appropriate index for 
measuring changes in social segregation between schools over time: 
 
The (Gorard) segregation index is the only index we have encountered which is thus able to 
separate the overall relative growth of FSM from changes in the distribution of FSM between 
schools.  It is suitably ironic that some commentators in educational research have turned 
this situation on its head and argued that our index is sensitive to changes in composition, 
while the decomposed index of isolation (P. Noden, 2000) or even unscaled percentage point 
differences (Gibson & Asthana, 2000) are composition invariant.  That is how wars start!  
(Taylor et al., 2000) 
 
The remainder of this section argues that, though the desire to create an index that can deal 
with the phenomenon of pupils changing their FSM status was important, GS is a measure of 
segregation with various features that we suggest renders it less desirable to use in measuring 
segregation between schools.  We are not the first to make many of these arguments: Gorard 
rightly points out that his index, or close variants on it, has been proposed in the past in other 
fields.  It’s most cited appearance was as the ‘WE’ index (which is actually 2*GS) used in an 
OECD study of Women and Employment (Moir & Selby Smith, 1979; OECD, 1980).  
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However, the WE index has not been used in the field of occupational gender segregation 
since the mid-1980s, for many of the same reasons we discuss below.   
 
3.2  GS is not bounded by 0 and 1 
As has been shown, the GS index is calculated by shrinking the dissimilarity index (D) by a 
factor of (1-p).  The result is that GS is bounded by 0 and (1-p), i.e. it’s upper limit is variable.  
It seems desirable that any index has clear fixed limits, and the convention is that these are 0 
and 1.  This is a desirable feature because the meaning of complete segregation and complete 
integration is something that all researchers can agree on, so it seems logical that these should 
display fixed values of 0 and 1.  The value of an index in any particular year or area can only 
have relative meaning with respect to the distance of the value from the boundaries of the 
index.  Where the maximum value is varying according to the overall FSM proportion, the 
range will not be standard in each situation being compared.  This means the value of the 
index cannot be standard either. 
 
Following the argument of Blackburn et al. (1993) in their criticism of WE index, we say that 
it is not possible to directly compare two values of GS that come from indices with differing 
boundaries.  This will always be the case where the comparison groups have different overall 
FSM eligibility, which ironically is the precise situation for which the GS was suggested.  As 
an illustration, in England the FSM proportion rose from 8% in 1989 to 16% in 1993.  GS is 
therefore bounded by 0 and 0.92 in 1989, but 0 and 0.84 in 1993.  The value of GS fell in this 
period from 0.35 to 0.32, and the GS would describe this as a fall in segregation: indeed the 
value of GS is nearer to evenness (0).  However, because the upper bound of the index has 
also fallen, segregation could also be described as being closer to total segregation, as 
illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
We do, however, recognise that the absolute value of GS does have a specific meaning in 
itself and Cortese et al. (1976) suggest that it could be used as one indicator of the 
‘displacement’ caused by segregation, which might aid interpretation of D.  Once D is 
calculated, GS or D*(1-p) is the proportion of FSM pupils that would have to exchange 
schools in order to achieve evenness.  D*p is the proportion of NONFSM pupils that must 
exchange schools to achieve evenness and D*2p(1-p) is the proportion of all pupils that would 
have to exchange schools to achieve evenness.5 6  
 
Figure 4  Comparing the Value of Gorard’s Segregation Index between 1989 and 1993 
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The implication of the variable upper bound is that when using GS, segregation is always 
relatively low in areas of high FSM eligibility, even if all the NONFSM pupils are 
concentrated in one school.  We argue that this view of the costs of segregation is an 
undesirable one. It implies that the range of possible effects of segregation is smaller where 
90% of pupils are FSM eligible (maximum value of GS = 0.1), compared to a situation where, 
say, 5% of pupils are FSM (maximum value of GS = 0.95).  We argue that since we 
understand so little about the relationship between segregation and social welfare, this 
supports the case for using a 0-1 bounded relative index.  These 0-1 indices tell us the ‘cost’ 
                                                 
5 Note that 2*p(1-p) is the maximum possible value of the weighted sum of the absolute deviations of the FSM proportion for each school: 
∑
=
−
I
i
i
i pp
N
n
1
, where pi is the FSM percentage in school i. 
6 By contrast, D’s absolute interpretation as ‘the share of either group which must be removed, without replacement, to achieve zero 
segregation’ is not particularly useful to us in the field of school segregation since if we remove a child from one school, we must place them 
in another. 
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of segregation to society, not in an absolute sense, but relative to complete segregation and 
complete evenness.  Interpretation of segregation indices is clearly always complex, but at 
least where an index is bounded by 0 and 1 it is ‘fair’ in that all LEAs have the ‘opportunity’ 
to be more or less segregated than one another. 
 
3.3  GS is not symmetric 
It is well recognised that one cannot switch the ‘labels’ on the FSM and NONFSM pupils and 
get the same value of GS, i.e. that GS is not symmetric.  So, for example, the groups of 
schools in Figure 5 and Figure 6 will have different values of GS even though from an 
evenness perspective they could be described as identical mirror images of each other.  We do 
not argue that symmetry is always a desirable feature of an index; indeed, we exploit the non-
symmetry of other indices later in this article.  However, where indices are not symmetric, 
interpretation becomes more difficult.  If FSM pupils are separated from NONFSM pupils, 
NONFSM are also separated from FSM pupils, and this implies a symmetrical relationship 
(Blackburn et al., 1993).  Where an index is not symmetric there exists two values for the 
index, and movements in the values may be contradictory (Karmel & MacLachlan, 1988).  
For example, how can we interpret a situation where segregation is said to be falling for FSM 
pupils, yet rising for NONFSM pupils?   
 
In the case of segregation of FSM versus NONFSM pupils, it may be the effect of segregation 
of FSM pupils that is of interest to us.  However this is a normative judgement. Indeed, from a 
social welfare perspective, it may be the numbers of NONFSM pupils in each school that 
determines the effect of school segregation on the FSM pupils themselves.  In other situations 
it is not entirely clear which group of pupils we want to treat as the ‘minority’ group.  Are 
FSM pupils in Tower Hamlets the minority group (they constitute over 60% of all pupils)?  
How can we treat girls or boys as the minority group?  If we want to know about the 
unevenness of the distribution of high ability pupils (e.g. the top 20%) across schools, can we 
still say they are the ‘minority’, and does a non-symmetric index infer that our treatment of 
them in this respect places a greater emphasis on their welfare rather than the welfare of all 
pupils? In essence, the use of non-symmetric indices poses a number of problems of 
interpretation that need to be more fully explored if such indices are to be used to measure 
school segregation. 
 
Figure 5  GS is 0.23 Figure 6  GS is 0.07 
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3.4  The undesirability of ‘Strong Composition Invariance’ (SCI) 
Gorard et al. argue an index should remain constant if pupils switch their status from 
NONFSM to FSM in such a manner that fsm1=λfsm0 in every school in the LEA, allowing all 
schools to retain their existing shares of FSM pupils as the overall FSM proportion rises or 
falls.  Where an index meets this requirement it can be said to be ‘strongly composition 
invariant’ (SCI).  The SCI property means GS would not change in these circumstances, yet 
because these same pupils have lost their NONFSM status, this event will change the 
distribution of NONFSM pupils across schools.  The nature of the constant proportionate 
increase in FSM means that the probability that a NONFSM child switches to FSM status is 
higher in schools with the highest FSM proportion.  Therefore, these (already deprived) 
schools lose the greatest share of their NONFSM pupils, thus increasing the unevenness of the 
distribution of NONFSM pupils.  In practical terms this means that a large constant 
proportionate increase in FSM is often not achievable because the most deprived school does 
not have enough NONFSM pupils to lose.  When the SCI property is met, the resulting 
change in the unevenness of the NONFSM pupils changes the shape of the segregation curve.  
Thus, no index that has the SCI property can be consistent with the segregation curve 
approach. 
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Using Annual Schools Census data, similar to that held by Gorard,7 the segregation curve in 
figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of the unevenness in the distribution of FSM and 
NONFSM pupils in 1989 (using take-up) and 1995 (using eligibility, in line with Gorard’s 
analysis).  Since the curves are non-overlapping we can say that school segregation in 
Hackney – defined as unevenness of FSM pupils versus NONFSM pupils on a 0-1 measure - 
rose over these 6 years.  However, the value of GS fell from 0.11 in 1989 to 0.10 in 1995; so, 
the problem of GS incorrectly ranking segregation curve is substantive in schools data.  D, 
which is solely a geometrical function of the segregation curve, rose from 0.14 in 1989 to 
0.30 in 1995.  GS and D disagree on whether segregation actually fell or rose in an LEA 
between 1989 and 1995 in 35% of cases.   
 
It can also be shown that GS incorrectly ranks segregation curves for two LEAs in any one 
year.  Figure 8 shows that in 1995 the level of FSM segregation was higher in Tower Hamlets 
than in Ealing, and D correctly reflects this with values of 0.26 and 0.17 respectively.  
However, GS identifies Ealing as having the higher level of segregation (0.12 versus 0.09); it 
does this because it reduces D by a scalar (1-p), producing a small number in Tower Hamlets 
where overall FSM eligibility is very high.  It would not matter how segregated Tower 
Hamlets schools had become: GS would never have risen above 0.21 in 1995.  If we placed 
LEAs in deciles according to their value of D and GS in 1995, the two indices would disagree 
about which decile the LEA should be in 63% of cases. 
 
The intuition behind the GS index of segregation seems sensible: it would seem unfair to 
attribute to schools changes that arise from general changes in the probability of being of 
FSM status.  It is generally agreed amongst researchers of segregation that a good index 
should have an expected value that is not a function of the overall FSM proportion in the LEA 
(Winship, 1978), i.e. it is composition invariant.  D is said to be composition invariant 
according to the conventional definition that the index should be invariant following ‘uniform 
percentage changes in the number of [NONFSM] and [FSM] in each [school] reflecting the 
 
7 Our pre-1998 data uses pre-LGR definitions of LEAs, whereas Gorard aggregated schools on the basis on the new LEA boundaries.  There 
are also occasional discrepancies in our calculation of GS versus those published by Gorard, but never by more than 0.01. 
Figure 7  The Rise in Segregation in Hackney between 1989 and 1995 
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overall, but typically unequal, percentage changes in [FSM eligibility]’ (Watts, 1998).8  D is 
said to be independent of overall FSM eligibility (p) because it is solely a function of the 
segregation curve (Duncan & Duncan, 1955).  The intuition behind this statement is that the 
segregation curve plots the shares of FSM pupils on one axis against the shares of the 
NONFSM pupils on the other.  The distribution of these two groups can be treated as 
independent of each other since no pupil appears in both groups and each axis plots the 
cumulative distribution from 0% to 100%, regardless of the relative size of the two groups 
overall.  Therefore, no part of drawing a segregation curve relies on knowledge of the value 
p.9  Since GS = D*(1-p) and D is known to be solely a function of the segregation curve, GS 
is a function of the overall FSM proportion (i.e. p) in the area in question.  Indeed any index 
that is ‘strongly compositionally invariant’, such as GS, must partially be a function of the 
overall FSM proportion, so we can properly describe it as ‘composition variant’, i.e. it will 
vary systematically where the overall FSM proportion differs.  GS creates a paradox whereby 
                                                 
8 We set aside the issue of random allocation bias that does make the distance of D from randomness (as opposed to evenness) a function of 
p. 
9 The segregation curve approach is not the only way to demonstrate the independence of the value of D to changes in p: Zoloth (1976) gives 
a short mathematical decomposition of D’s formula to show the same result. 
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greater dissimilarity combined with higher levels of overall poverty may result in a lower 
measure of segregation. 
 
Figure 8  FSM Segregation in Tower Hamlets versus Ealing 
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Showing that GS is a function of p (i.e. composition variant) is however not a trivial issue and 
has been suggested by other authors, but strongly refuted by Stephen Gorard (see earlier 
quote).  Gibson and Asthana (2000) and Philip Noden (2000) pointed out the very high (over 
0.95) correlation between the national segregation level measured by GS and England’s 
overall FSM proportion.  Gibson and Asthana also showed that over 70% of the variation in 
GS between LEAs can be explained by FSM eligibility and the number of pupils in the LEA. 
 
 
4 Re-Examining the Empirical Evidence (1989 to 2004) 
 
This section re-examines Gorard et al.’s (2003, pages 58-63) presentation of changes in the 
social composition of schools between 1989 and 1995.  It goes on to present new empirical 
evidence on the extent and nature of segregation within LEAs between 1999 and 2004, using 
various segregation curve consistent measures of segregation. 
 
4.1 (Un) changing school segregation from 1989 onwards 
Re-analysis of Annual Schools Census data for the years 1989 and 1995 using D indicates 
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that Gorard et al. were indeed correct in stating that, nationally, FSM segregation between 
schools fell during this period.  However, by using the GS index with its falling upper bound 
(as the FSM measure rose) they overstated the magnitude of the fall by around 100%: D 
(measured nationally using FSM take-up in both years) fell by 5% from 0.292 in 1989 to 
0.277 in 1995; GS fell by 10%.  The picture in individual LEAs during this period is more 
balanced: segregation rose in 42% of (the 107 pre-LGR) LEAs; it fell in the remaining 62%.  
The national fall is shown in figure 9 to demonstrate that the fall in D was highly concentrated 
in the recession years of 1991 to 1993.  We note that the national segregation figures are 
relatively uninteresting since they combine changes in the distribution of FSM pupils between 
LEA or regions (resulting, for example, from the migration of families) with changes in the 
distribution of FSM pupils within LEAs. 
 
As noted by others including Gorard himself, it is unlikely that the substantial fall in the value 
of the GS index between two consecutive years (it fell 7% between 1991 and 1992) represents 
genuine changes in segregation across schools, caused by choice, as opposed to the impact of 
the recession.  Our sub-unit of analysis is the entire school, i.e. five year groups grouped 
together.  Therefore between 1991 and 1992, four of the cohorts would have been identical.  
A huge difference in the evenness of FSM pupils between those who left the school in 1991 
and those who joined in 1992 would be required to make genuine changes in segregation, 
perhaps due to school choice, a primary explanation for the fall in the value of the GS index.  
Furthermore, it would seem likely that if genuine changes in segregation explained such a 
substantial fall in the GS index over the two year period, surely segregation would have 
continued to fall at a similar rate in the following few years; yet it did not.10
 
4.2 FSM school segregation in 2004 
Levels of FSM segregation within LEAs in 2004 vary from as low as 0.11 in the tiny LEA of 
Rutland (with just 3 schools) to as high as 0.51 in Buckinghamshire.  Overall, the average 
level of FSM segregation in English LEAs, weighted for LEA size, was 0.29 in 2004.  The 
region with the greatest within LEA segregation was the North West, as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
10 Using FSM take-up, GS is 0.353 in 1991; 0.329 in 1992; 0.308 in 1993; 0.298 in 1994; 0.300 in 1995. 
Figure 9  The Fall in School Segregation between 1989 and 1995 
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One cannot use this type of cross-sectional approach to suggest why some LEAs have greater 
levels of school segregation than others since causality is not easily established in this 
context.  However, the value of D for each LEA in 2004 can be regressed against a range of 
variables describing different aspects of an LEA to examine associations between the level of 
segregation in an LEA and various characteristics of that LEA.11  This is in itself a useful 
exercise as it highlights the types of LEAs that have, on average, higher levels of segregation. 
 
Table 2 indicates that LEAs with higher proportions of pupils at grammar schools and higher 
proportions of pupils at voluntary-aided (VA) schools are all associated with higher levels of 
segregation. Although these results do not imply that VA schools are responsible for 
increasing the level of segregation in an LEA, they do confirm that it is those LEAs with the 
highest proportions of grammar and VA schools that face the highest levels of segregation. 
 
                                                 
11 Though we do not discuss it in this article, we recognise that D should only be cautiously used as a dependent variable in a regression for 
two reasons.  First, its use as a dependent variable means that we treat the values of the index as having cardinal meaning, so we would only 
want to do this where we accepted the linear payoff criterion of D as being appropriate given our view of segregation and social welfare.  
Second, we recognise that D displays a systematic random allocation bias where the value is non-zero even under random allocation and the 
extent of the bias depends on various features of each LEA. 
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Table 1  Summary LEA Segregation by Region in 2004 
 
Name of Region 
No. 
of 
LEAs 
Weighted 
mean D Lowest D Highest D 
South West 15 0.24 0.15 (Cornwall) 0.42 (Poole) 
London 32 0.28 0.16 (Islington) 0.46 (H’smith & Fulham) 
East Midlands 9 0.29 0.11 (Rutland) 0.39 (Lincolnshire) 
North East 12 0.29 0.22 (Middlesbrough) 0.39 (Stockton-on-Tees) 
East of England 10 0.29 0.23 (Norfolk) 0.39 (Southend) 
England 148 0.29 0.11 (Rutland) 0.51 (Buckinghamshire) 
West Midlands 14 0.29 0.20 (Sandwell) 0.43 (Solihull) 
South East 19 0.30 0.13 (West Berkshire) 0.51 (Buckinghamshire) 
Yorkshire & The Humber 15 0.31 0.20 (Rotherham) 0.39 (Bradford) 
North West 22 0.32 0.16 (Knowsley) 0.40 (Bolton) 
 
 
Table 2  Association between LEA Segregation and School Types 
 
Number of obs. 
148 (weighted for 
LEA size) 
Adj. R squared 0.34  
   
Coefficient Estimate P value 
Population density in LEA -0.95 0.013 
LEA FSM proportion in 2004 0.08 0.354 
Proportion of pupils at grammars 0.39 0.000 
Proportion of pupils at CTCs/academies 0.20 0.389 
Proportion of pupils at VA schools 0.23 0.000 
Proportion of pupils at foundation schools 0.05 0.073 
Constant 0.24 0.000 
 
 
4.3 Different locations of segregation 
Thus far we have relied on values of dissimilarity (D) to measure the level of segregation in 
an LEA. However, this may mask very different patterns of distribution of FSM pupils within 
LEAs.  Drawing segregation curves for LEAs such as those in figure 10 illustrates this idea 
clearly.  Both Lambeth and Birmingham had equal values of D (0.38).  Lambeth’s 
segregation curve is very steep on the far right hand side of the graph, suggesting that a large 
proportion of low-income pupils are highly concentrated in one or two schools.  In other 
words, this LEA faces concentrations of its disadvantaged pupils.  Birmingham’s segregation 
curve is very flat on the left hand side of the graph, which means that there is a set of schools 
in the LEA with very few low income pupils.  Thus, this LEA faces concentrations of more 
advantaged pupils.  Clearly there are potentially different policy implications for these two 
different manifestations of the same level of segregation. 
 
Figure 10  Segregation Curves for Lambeth and Birmingham 
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There exist a set of segregation-curve-consistent indices called the Generalized Entropy 
Measures of Segregation (R. M. Hutchens, 2004) that allow us to distinguish between these 
different patterns of FSM pupils in LEAs.  The formula for these indices is: 
10,1.)(
1
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Where c = 0.5, the index is symmetrical and is termed the Square Root index; otherwise they 
are non-symmetrical and it is this feature that allows us to use them to distinguish between 
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LEAs with ‘concentrations of disadvantage’ as compared to ‘concentrations of advantage’.  
We use a log ratio of the values of O0.1(x) and O0.9(x) (the choice of 0.1 and 0.9 being quite 
arbitrary) to rank LEAs in terms of their tendency to display ‘disadvantaged’ versus 
‘advantaged’ segregation.  This allows us to rank the proportionate differences in skewness 
between LEAs; where 0 indicates no skewness, positive values indicate increasing 
concentrations of advantage and negative values indicate increasing concentrations of 
disadvantage.  We call this log ratio the ‘segregation skew’ of the distribution of FSM and 
NONFSM pupils: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= )(
)(log
9.0
1.0
xO
xOskewnsegregatio  (4) 
 
The greater the value of the segregation skew, the greater the concentrations of ‘advantage’ in 
the LEA: Birmingham’s value of the ratio is +0.22.  The lower the value of the segregation 
skew, the greater the concentrations of ‘disadvantage’ in the LEA: Lambeth’s value of the 
ratio is -0.20. 
 
Table 3 shows that English LEAs typically show concentrations of advantage and that these 
are most pronounced in the West Midlands region.  Reading LEA shows the greatest 
concentration of advantage at +0.71.  By contrast, Brighton & Hove LEA shows the greatest 
tendency towards concentrations of disadvantage.  It should be emphasised that the value of 
the segregation skew does not indicate the absolute level of concentration of disadvantage or 
advantage.  It simply indicates the tendency towards a concentration of 
disadvantage/advantage for any given level of segregation.   
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, greater skewness towards concentration of advantage is correlated 
with a greater proportion of pupils in grammar schools (ρ = 0.43), voluntary-aided schools (ρ 
= 0.25) and foundation schools (ρ = 0.18). 
 
4.4 Recent changes in social segregation between schools 
Over the five year period of 1999 to 2004, the empirical evidence paints a mixed picture of 
rising social segregation between schools in 60% of LEAs and falling segregation in 40% (see 
table 4).  School segregation has risen fastest in London, with a mean increase in D of 9% 
over the period.  Indeed static or rising segregation is the trend in most regions, although the 
South East region has seen a dominant trend of falling segregation. However, these regional 
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Table 3  Skewness in the Segregation Curve 
 
Name of Region 
No. of 
LEAs 
Mean 
ratio 
LEAs with greatest 
concentration of 
disadvantage 
LEAs with greatest 
concentration of 
advantage 
Yorkshire & The Humber 15 +0.01 -0.14 (Rotherham) +0.17 (Bradford) 
East Midlands 9 +0.03 -0.05 (Leicestershire) +0.13 (Lincolnshire) 
East of England 10 +0.04 -0.12 (Bedfordshire) +0.14 (Peterborough) 
North East 12 +0.05 -0.06 (Newcastle) +0.21 (Stockton-on-Tees) 
South West 15 +0.06 -0.13 (Swindon) +0.22 (Wiltshire) 
England 148 +0.07 -0.21 (Brighton & Hove) +0.71 (Reading) 
South East 19 +0.07 -0.21 (Brighton & Hove) +0.71 (Reading) 
North West 22 +0.08 -0.08 (Rochdale) +0.33 (Manchester) 
London 32 +0.11 -0.20 (Lambeth) +0.30 (Westminster) 
West Midlands 14 +0.12 -0.05 (Sandwell) +0.33 (Telford & Wrekin) 
 
trends hide inter-LEA differences within regions: even in the South East 37% of LEAs 
actually saw a rise in segregation over the period, despite the downward regional trend.  Some 
LEAs saw substantial rises in the value of D during the period: the LEAs with the greatest 
proportionate growth in the value of D over this period were 58% in Lambeth, 57% in 
Barking and Dagenham and 37% in Brighton and Hove.   
 
Table 4  Changes in LEA segregation between 1999 and 2004 
 
 
No. of 
LEAs 
Average 
change in 
D 
Greatest 
LEA fall 
Greatest 
LEA rise 
% of 
LEA with 
higher D 
in 2004 
% of 
LEA with 
lower D 
in 2004 
South East 19 -2% -26% 37% 37% 63% 
East of England 10 1% -16% 13% 70% 30% 
East Midlands 9 2% -15% 10% 56% 44% 
West Midlands 14 3% -20% 27% 50% 50% 
Yorkshire & The Humber 15 3% -19% 24% 60% 40% 
England 148 3% -38% 58% 60% 40% 
South West 15 3% -20% 19% 47% 53% 
North East 12 4% -38% 37% 67% 33% 
North West 22 6% -11% 25% 77% 23% 
London 32 9% -16% 58% 69% 31% 
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Again identifying the causes of changes in the level of segregation across LEAs is 
problematic. However, one can look at associations between changes in D and LEA 
characteristics. We have done this and our results, consistent with work of other researchers, 
suggest that school closure continues to be associated with falling segregation: schools have 
closed in 12 of the 20 LEAs where the value of D fell by over 10%.  Regression of the 
percentage change in D between 1999 and 2004 in table 5 confirms this relationship. 
 
Table 5  Regression of Percentage Change in Segregation 99-04 
 
Number of obs. 
148 (weighted for 
LEA size) 
Adj R-squared 0.26  
   
Coefficient Estimate P value 
Population density 0.00 0.285 
Dissimilarity in 1999 -0.47 0.003 
Proportion of pupils at VA schools in 1999 0.24 0.020 
Proportion of pupils at grammar schools in 1999 0.10 0.368 
Proportion of pupils at foundation schools in 1999 0.01 0.758 
Proportion of pupils at CTC/academy schools in 1999 -1.36 0.002 
Change in number of pupils in LEA 0.07 0743 
Change in number of schools 0.32 0.017 
Change in LEA FSM proportion 0.08 0.426 
Change in proportion at VA schools 0.12 0.036 
Change in proportion at grammar schools -0.36 0.025 
Change in proportion at foundation schools 0.14 0.238 
Change in proportion at CTC/academy schools 0.04 0.688 
Constant 0.13 0.008 
 
Given their level of prior attainment, there is evidence that FSM-eligible pupils are heavily 
under-represented in grammar schools. Whether this under-representation improves as 
grammar schools expand is an empirical matter. Growing grammar schools might take 
additional pupils eligible for FSM, or they might fill newly available places with non-FSM 
eligible pupils. Table 5 shows that areas with higher proportions of grammar schools have not 
generally been associated with falling segregation, but where there has been a growth in the 
proportion of pupils at grammar schools segregation appears to have fallen.  It is possible this 
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is due to grammar schools accepting pupils from lower down the ability spectrum as they 
expand, and therefore increasing their FSM share (albeit from extremely low levels to very 
low levels)12.  
 
Interestingly, areas with a higher proportion of pupils at voluntary-aided schools in 1999 have 
seen greater growth in segregation between 1999 and 2004.  Where these VA schools have 
grown in size, increasing their share of pupils in the LEA, this is again associated with 
increasing segregation.  Once again, while this pattern of changes in segregation is interesting, 
it would be unwise to attribute causation of this phenomenon to the behaviour of VA schools. 
 
4.5 Describing changes in segregation curves using a set of indices 
When segregation increases in an LEA, the nature of the change in the shape of the 
segregation curve will depend on the cause and location of the increased segregation.  In 
particular, segregation might increase as a result of the school with the most deprived intake 
increasing its share of FSM pupils further, thereby concentrating disadvantage. Alternatively, 
segregation might increase if the school with the fewest FSM pupils reduces its share of FSM 
pupils, thereby concentrating advantage. 
 
Segregation curves are an effective means to understand the nature of changes in segregation, 
but we suggest that a set of statistics based on the set of Generalized Entropy Measures of 
Segregation can summarise the salient features of the change in the shape of the curve.  Using 
Reading LEA in figure 11 as an example, we suggest that four values can be used to describe 
both the level and changes in segregation as follows: 
 
(a) the general level of school segregation can be represented by a symmetrical segregation 
curve approach index, such as D, the gini coefficient of segregation or Hutchens Square Root 
index (i.e. O0.5(x)).  So, for Reading LEA the level of FSM segregation in 1999 was D=0.28, 
which is higher than the typical LEA (64th highest of 148 LEAs). 
 
12 The processes driving this result are not clear. Furthermore the coefficient on the variable measuring the change in the proportion of pupils 
enrolled in grammar schools is an average effect across all Local Authorities, including those with very high and very low proportions of 
pupils in grammar schools.  
(b) the skew of school segregation – concentrations of ‘advantage’ versus ‘disadvantage’ – 
can be measured using ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= )(
)(log
9.0
1.0
xO
xOskewnsegregatio .  For Reading LEA the skew 
in 1999 was +0.74, one of the highest in the country (rank 12 of 148). 
(c) the increase in school segregation can be represent by the growth in a symmetrical index.  
For Reading LEA, the growth in FSM segregation between 1999 and 2004 was 2% (lower 
than the typical LEA). 
(d) the location of the change in school segregation, or change in skew, can be measured 
using a ratio indicating the relative skew in the two years: 
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Figure 11  Increase in FSM Segregation in Reading 
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Here a value of 0 indicates that there is no change in the skewness of segregation; a positive 
value indicates that the increase in segregation is located in the most advantaged schools; a 
negative value indicates that the increase in segregation is located in the most disadvantaged 
schools.  For Reading LEA the value is -0.03, suggesting that Reading schools where the 
FSM proportion was already high in 1999 have increased their share of FSM pupils, thus 
increasing segregation.  This is consistent with Figure 11. 
 
As a further illustration of this approach, Figure 12 shows that Hammersmith & Fulham has a 
high, and rising, level of segregation (D=0.41 in 1999 with growth of 13% to 2004).  It shows 
some skew towards having concentrations of ‘advantage’ (segregation skew = +0.14 in 1999), 
and has become more so over the five year period (∆ segregation skew = +0.13). 
 
Figure 12  Increase in FSM Segregation in Hammersmith & Fulham 
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Figure 13 shows Brighton & Hove LEA had a low level of segregation in 1999 (D = 0.14), 
but it has risen significantly over the five year period to 2004 (growth = 37%).  The skew in 
the segregation curve suggests concentrations of disadvantage, with one or more schools with 
FSM eligibility significantly above the LEA average (segregation skew = -0.12).  This skew 
towards concentrations of disadvantage has increased (∆ segregation skew = -0.09). 
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Figure 13  Increase in FSM Segregation in Brighton & Hove 
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Using these four indicators to describe the extent and nature of segregation in an LEA, we can 
then identify particular trends that one might be concerned about, for example where the FSM 
pupils are becoming increasingly concentrated in one or two schools (often with falling rolls). 
Thus we might be particularly concerned if we see segregation rising with the increases in 
segregation concentrated at the right-hand end of the segregation curve, as was the case in 
Brighton & Hove during the period 1999-2004.  
 
4.6 Is school choice increasing social segregation? 
What can we conclude from the patterns of segregation occurring across England more 
generally? During the period in question, we do not see a pervasive increase in segregation, as 
was widely predicted to occur as a result of increased school choice. There are a number of 
potential explanations for this. Firstly, it may be that de facto school choice did not in fact 
increase during this period. This would be the case for example, if school choice was already 
being exercised through parents’ choices of residential location (Gibbons & Machin, 2006) 
and if capacity constraints prevented the further exercise of choice. A second and related 
explanation is that the growth in pupil numbers in English secondary schools might have 
partially offset any potential segregation effect from school choice (there was a 1% increase 
in the secondary school population between 1999 and 2004).  If the schools higher up the 
LEA league table of GCSE results were already full in 1999, and capacity did not 
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significantly increase at these schools, the additional pupils would need to be taken by schools 
lower down the league tables, protecting them from a serious deterioration in their intake.  We 
have undertaken some analysis of this issue. In fact, as table 6 shows, schools in all parts of 
the league table experienced growth in pupil numbers during this time, though this growth 
was lower at the very bottom of the league table. A third outcome is of course that choice has 
increased but has genuinely not led to increased segregation. This might occur if lower 
income parents were most constrained prior to the introduction of greater choice and have 
therefore been the group most able to benefit from choice. 
 
Table 6  Changes in School Size between 1999 and 2004 
 
 
Mean change in school 
share of LEA pupils 
Mean change in FSM 
proportion relative to LEA 
Schools in bottom quintile of LEA league 
table of GCSE (5 A*-C) results in 1999 0.94% 6.20% 
Quintile 2 2.82% 5.14% 
Quintile 3 3.24% 1.83% 
Quintile 4 2.68% -0.52% 
Schools in top quintile of LEA league 
table of GCSE (5 A*-C) results in 1999 2.51% 1.11% 
All schools 2.50% 2.54% 
 
Our evidence suggests that the level of school segregation needs to be of continuing concern 
to policy-makers, for several reasons.  First, these results do provide clear evidence of rising 
segregation in many LEAs, notably many in London and for those with higher proportions of 
pupils educated at voluntary-aided schools.  We need more work to understand the underlying 
causes of this phenomenon.  Second, whilst we have not been able evaluate the causal impact 
of policies that give schools increased control over their own admissions on segregation, there 
is a significant association between the level of FSM segregation and LEAs with higher 
proportions of pupils in schools that control their own admissions or have explicit select by 
ability. Certainly, as the proportion of schools that are LEA community schools continues to 
fall, the level of segregation needs careful monitoring.   Finally, pupil numbers in secondary 
schools will fall from 2005 onwards.  It will be important that measures are taken to improve 
the ability of disadvantaged pupils to take up free places in the schools of their choice, 
otherwise the spare capacity that emerges in the system may well result in rising levels of 
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segregation and in particular a concentration of disadvantaged pupils in some schools 
operating in deprived areas. 
 
 
5 Concluding Comments 
 
Gorard, Taylor and Fitz were the first researchers to use existing large-scale datasets to 
challenge the ‘crisis account’ that school choice would result in increasing social segregation 
and ‘spirals of decline’ for underperforming schools.  Using alternative measures of 
segregation, we agree with Gorard et al.’s main conclusion that there has been no substantial 
across the board increase in socio-economic segregation between schools in the majority of 
LEAs since the Education Reform Act of 1988.  However, our methods of measuring 
segregation do generate substantively different results to those produced by the measure of 
segregation devised by Gorard et al., namely the GS index. We conclude that the GS index 
actually overstates the magnitude of the fall in segregation in the 1990s by around 100%.  Our 
results suggest that the level of school segregation should be of continuing concern to 
policymakers.  Our evidence suggests rising segregation in many LEAs, particularly in 
London, and we found a significant association between the level of segregation in an 
Authority and the proportions of pupils educated at voluntary-aided schools, although this 
relationship is not necessarily causal.   
 
Much of this paper is a critique of previous methods used to measure segregation in schools. 
For example, we suggest that the GS index is not the optimal way of measuring changes in 
school segregation for the following reasons: 
 
1. GS is not bounded by 0 and 1: the upper boundary varies according to FSM eligibility, 
so GS is better described as an ‘indicator’ rather than an index of segregation; 
 
2. GS is not symmetric, meaning that it is capable of showing that FSM segregation is 
rising and NONFSM segregation is falling simultaneously; and 
 
3. GS is actually systematically variant to changes in overall FSM eligibility, except in 
the most stringent and unlikely of circumstances (the strict proportionate change in 
FSM); therefore we can properly describe it as composition variant.  It had a tendency 
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to fall as FSM eligibility rises, regardless of the change in the unevenness of school’s 
shares of FSM and NONFSM pupils. 
 
We recognise that the GS index has meaning. It can be used, for example, to count the 
proportion of FSM pupils that would have to switch schools to achieve evenness.  However, 
in this paper we have made the case for a segregation curve approach to measuring 
segregation.  This is an approach where comparisons of the level of segregation are possible 
regardless of the percentage FSM eligibility (p).  Therefore, it can be used in cross-sectional 
and time-series comparisons of school segregation.  This is because segregation curve 
approach indices are 0-1 bounded and solely a function of the segregation curve, which itself 
is independent of p.  The value of the index is therefore the relative level of segregation 
compared to complete evenness and complete segregation.  Given how difficult it is to 
quantify the effect of segregation on social welfare, we suggest that the relative approach is 
superior.  Though we have relied on the dissimilarity index for much of this article, we have 
not made a claim for its superiority over other segregation curve consistent indices, notably 
the Gini index and Hutchen’s Square Root index.  Researchers wanting to take a segregation 
curve approach to the measurement of segregation should choose the index that aligns most 
closely with their view of the effects of segregation on social welfare. 
 
We do not, however, want to overstate the case for a segregation curve approach to measuring 
segregation.  First, it cannot separate out the change in segregation due to school choice as 
compared to processes that change overall FSM eligibility.  We take the view that it is not 
possible to construct an index to do this.  Second, it measures the effect of segregation in an 
area relative to the maximum possible effect if pupils were completely segregated, yet we 
recognise that the effect of segregation on social welfare may differ in areas of high 
deprivation versus low deprivation.  Finally, the segregation curve judges the degree of 
segregation in a specific way: it measures unevenness based on each school’s share of FSM 
pupils versus their share of NONFSM pupils.  We recognise that unevenness is not the only 
dimension of segregation; therefore researchers will continue to use other approaches too. 
 
Deciding how best to measure segregation is complex, combining fundamentally normative 
judgements about what exactly one intends to measure, with more technical judgements about 
the appropriate properties of the chosen measure.  We believe that we have made a good case 
for a specific approach, being open about the normative judgements we have made to reach 
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our conclusion.  We have chosen to criticise one alternative approach to measuring 
segregation, GS, examining its properties in detail. Further research is certainly needed to 
subject alternative methods of measuring school segregation, such as multilevel modelling or 
the isolation index, to the same level of scrutiny. 
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